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PurposeThe study aims to empirically understand individuals' tendency to disclose private information online following different forms of data breach (i.e. reversible and irreversible victimization).Design/methodology/approachSurvey methodology is applied to measure the perception of victims of data breaches on key indicators of information disclosure.FindingsAnalysis of responses from 309 victims of data breaches show that while victims' irreversible data breach victimization experience influences both dimensions of privacy concerns, reversible data breach victimization experiences influenced only peer privacy concerns (PPCs). Furthermore, only institutional privacy concerns impacted online disclosure and fully mediate the relationship between victimization experience and online disclosure.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings contribute to the privacy literature by expanding the dimension of victimization and considering their differential effect on privacy concerns. Additionally, the study uncovers the efficacy of privacy dimension on privacy recalibration following a data breach announcement.Practical implicationsFor practice, the results provide insights for managers on how to manage customer restitution after a data breach. Management of the process of privacy recalibration should not be homogenous but be based on degree of consequence.Social implicationsThis research provides deeper understanding of how the ascendancy of privacy breaches affect privacy management. The findings illuminate why the increasing trend in online activities is observed.Originality/valueThe study is the first to identify two dimensions of data breach victimization experience based on the breach level index (BLI). The two dimensions of victimization (i.e. reversible and irreversible privacy victimizations) were used to understand individuals' tendency to disclose private information online.

I study the welfare and price implications of consumer privacy. A consumer discloses information to a multiproduct seller, which learns about his preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. Although the consumer benefits from accurate recommendations, the seller may use the information to price discriminate. I show that the seller prefers to commit to not use information for pricing in order to encourage information disclosure. However, this commitment hurts the consumer, who could be better off by precommitting to withhold some information. In contrast to single-product models, total surplus may be lower if the seller can base prices on information. (JEL D11, D83, L81, M31)

PurposeThis paper aims to examine motivations for young consumers' internet use, how these motivations relate to children's privacy concerns and, subsequently, children's willingness to disclose personally identifiable information.Design/methodology/approachThe strengths of three common internet usage motives (information seeking, entertainment, and socializing) in predicting disclosure behavior are examined via survey research with a sample of children aged 10‐12.FindingsTwo of the motives – information seeking and socializing – are found to influence privacy concerns, which in turn, are shown to affect willingness to disclose information. Information‐seeking motivations were positively related to privacy concerns, while socializing motivations were negatively related to privacy concerns. Direct incentives are also found to increase disclosure.Originality/valueThe findings suggest that the uses and gratifications theory is useful for understanding children's privacy behaviors relating to information seeking and socializing motivations. Combining this with the varying levels of interactivity of websites that might satisfy various motives helps researchers begin to understand how particular motives may lead to increases or decreases in risky behavior; in this case, preteen disclosure of personal information.

This study investigates the risk of being a target of an attempt at fraud through email by assessing the role of low self-control, online activities, and the disclosure of personal information. A secondary analysis of the 2014 U.S. "Caught in the Scammers' Net", a national survey of online victimization ( N = 1,539), indicates that those with low self-control and individuals who engage in online activities are more likely to disclose personal information online. The risk of being targeted with a fraudulent offer is also associated with low self-control and online routine activities. Responding to a fraudulent offer is associated with disclosing personal information online and low self-control. Taken together, our empirical evidence strengthens the central role of low self-control theory.

The authors propose and find that the mixed results of prior research regarding disclosure antecedents are due in part to a failure to account for information sensitivity. Using prospect theory to examine willingness to disclose in an online service context, the authors propose and find that greater sensitivity of information requested produces weaker effects of customization benefits but stronger effects of information control and online privacy concern. The authors also find that customization benefits can overcome the negative effects of sensitive information requests when concern is lower or control is higher, and that perceived risk and firm trust are mechanisms through which disclosure antecedents operate. For theory, this research suggests that online disclosure models need to include sensitivity of information as a moderator. Moreover, the privacy paradox (consumers voice concerns but still disclose) may result from a failure to account for information sensitivity, since the authors find no effect of privacy concern on overall disclosure but find the predicted negative effect for higher sensitive information. For practice, our research suggests actionable strategies to aid online marketers in matching information requests with the needs and concerns of consumers by providing greater control and customization, enhancing firm trust, and adapting information requests to the situation.

This paper analyzes a situation in which the seller controls the accuracy of what potential buyers learn about their valu- ation of a go o d to b e sold. This setting is related to many real situations such as home sales, antique auctions, and digital platforms such as Google and Facebook selling online adver- tising slots. Two important questions arise: what is the op- timal selling mechanism, and what is the optimal disclosure policy of the seller. Under the assumption of private values, a simple auction with a reserve price is the optimal mechanism. What we show is that the amount of (costly) information pro- vided increases with the numb er of p otential bidders when using the optimal mechanism and is greater than when the object is always sold. Because information changes the distri- bution of a bidder's expected valuations, the optimal reserve price also changes, so that the number of bidders (indirectly) ; Juan-José Ganuza gratefully acknowledges the support of the Barcelona GSE Research, the government of Catalonia, and the Agencia Estatal de Investigación through project ECO2017-89240-P (AEI/FEDER, UE). Jose Penalva acknowledges the support of the Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad through project ECO 2012–36559 and 2016/00118/001 (MINECO/FEDER, UE), and the Comunidad de Madrid S2015/HUM-3353 (EARLYFIN-CM).

Since Akerlof (1970), economists have understood the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets. The remarkable growth in online used goods auctions thus poses a puzzle. Part of the solution is that sellers voluntarily disclose their private information on the auction web page. This defines a precise contract -- to deliver the car shown for the closing price -- which helps protect the buyer from adverse selection. I test this theory using data from eBay Motors, finding that online disclosures are important price determinants, and that disclosure costs impact both the level of disclosure and prices. (JEL D44, D82, L81)

We study dynamic information disclosure by a sender attempting to persuade a partially informed receiver to take an action. We consider vertical and horizontal information. With vertical information, an optimal disclosure plan is static. If the sender cannot commit to the disclosure plan, there exists a simple Markov equilibrium with sequential disclosure. Shrinking the time interval to zero gives rise to full disclosure almost instantly. With horizontal information, the sender often benefits from sequential disclosure. Assuming partial commitment and a special receiver‐type space, a Markov equilibrium exists and almost instant full disclosure arises in the limit.

A seller designs a mechanism to sell a single object to a potential buyer whose private type is his incomplete information about his valuation. The seller can disclose additional information to the buyer about his valuation without observing its realization. In both discrete-type and continuous-type settings, we show that discriminatory disclosure—releasing different amounts of additional information to different buyer types—dominates full disclosure in terms of seller revenue. An implication is that the orthogonal decomposition technique, while an important tool in dynamic mechanism design, is generally invalid when information disclosure is part of the design. (JEL D11, D82, D83)